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68 abstract
The International Monetary Fund’s fourth review of the Fiscal Transparency Code 
from 2014 sets out the principle of participation according to which the govern­
ment must provide citizens with a brief, simple and easily understandable overview 
of the implications of all budgetary measures and with an opportunity to partici­
pate in the budgetary decision­making process. The Fiscal Transparency Code 
must be implemented in Croatia, which is an IMF member state, so this paper uses 
an interdisciplinary approach to point out the importance and economic effects of 
public participation in the budgetary process, identify the normative mechanisms 
of public participation in the budgetary process, and look into what they comprise 
of and whether they can help in achieving “participation in budgetary decision­
making”, as provided for by point 2.3.3. of the Code in Croatia. It is assumed that 
the Croatian legal system provides various normative mechanisms of public par­
ticipation in the budgetary process, which enables the implementation of the 
participation principle set out in the Code. These mechanisms are, however, not 
specific to the budgetary process itself, but rather represent general normative 
mechanisms of public participation, which apply in the legislative process as well.
Keywords: public, participation mechanisms, budgetary process, the Fiscal 
Transparency Code, Croatia
1 IntRoDUctIon
Even though the roots of fiscal transparency1 stem from texts written in ancient 
Greece2 as early as the 4th and 5th centuries BC, some mediaeval documents found 
in England and Catalonia, and a number of European constitutions dating from 
late 18th to mid-19th century (e.g. the French Constitution of 1791 and the Belgian 
Constitution of 1831)3, it was only in the 1990s that this idea was given more 
attention4 and that international requests for fiscal transparency were gradually 
formulated, eventually leading to a definition of fiscal transparency. 
The lack of fiscal transparency has been identified in professional literature as one 
of the causes of the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The rise in interest in 
fiscal transparency issues has increased further because of problems in the func-
tioning of the fiscal system, particularly in view of high deficit and public debt 
1 Kopits and Craig (1998:1) define fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at large about govern-
ment structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections”, while Petrie 
(2011:6) adds that fiscal transparency is a blanket term which comprises four main elements (dimensions): 
public availability of information, clarity of roles, accountability, and participation.
2 According to Aristotle (1988:178): “(...) In order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the 
revenue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with 
the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes.”
3 E.g. Title V, Article 3 of the French Constitution of 1791 stipulates the obligation to provide “detailed accounts 
of the expenditure of ministerial departments”. Under Article 116, paragraph 2 of the Belgian Constitution of 
1831, “[The] Court [of Audit] is responsible for examining and validating the general administration accounts 
and the accounts of all accounting officers answerable to the public treasury.” This provision is still found in 
the current Belgian Constitution, adopted in 2014. (For more information, see: Irwin, 2013:10-11 and 26-29.) 
4 According to Philipps and Stewart (2009:801), the reasons of such interest lie in “the neoliberal turn in eco-
nomic policy, which emphasizes fiscal discipline” and “the movement to reform institutions to promote good 
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69levels in some countries. In order to overcome these problems, it is crucial to 
implement institutional reforms, improve fiscal transparency and adopt fiscal 
rules (for more information, see: Drezgić, 2006:25). According to de Renzio and 
Wehner (2015:4), the “positive view of the potential impact of transparency and 
participation in fiscal matters”, such as effective fiscal management and account-
ability, reduced corruption, improved allocation of resources, more trust in the 
government and higher revenues, has “led to a growing set of international stand-
ards and norms”, i.e. rules.
The IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, adopted in April 1998, 
is the first comprehensive attempt at shaping international standards for IMF 
members’ fiscal policy management (for more information, see: Petrie, 1999:5). 
Four reviews of the document have been published so far (November 2017): in 
1999, 2001, 2007 and 2014. One of the main novelties introduced in the final 
(fourth) 2014 version, when the document was officially renamed The Fiscal 
Transparency Code (translated into Croatian by the Institute of Public Finance, 
2014; hereinafter: the FT Code) is the so-called principle of public participation 
(involvement)5 according to which “the government provides citizens with an 
accessible summary of the implications of budget policies and an opportunity to 
participate in budget deliberations” (item 2.3.3. of the FT Code).
Soon after it was incorporated into the FT Code, the principle of participation was 
incorporated in other international documents such as the OECD Recommen-
dation on Budgetary Governance (OECD, 2015)6 and the Principles of Public 
Participation in Fiscal Policy (GIFT, 2015)7. For instance, according to item 10 of 
GIFT’s High-Level Principles on Fiscal Transparency, Participation and Account-
ability (GIFT, 2012; hereinafter: High-Level Principles), citizens and all non-state 
actors should have the right and “effective opportunities to participate directly in 
public debate and discussion over the design and implementation of fiscal poli-
cies”. GIFT’s High-Level Principles have been endorsed by the United Nations 
General Assembly’s Resolution 67/218 adopted on 21 December 2012, stating in 
item 2 that member states are encouraged “to intensify efforts to enhance transpar-
ency, participation and accountability in fiscal policies, including through the consid-
eration of the principles set out by the [GIFT]” (for more information, see: United 
Nations, General Assembly, 2012).
Having in mind that the public participation principle, as one dimension of fiscal 
transparency, is being incorporated in an increasing number of international docu-
ments, this paper examines more closely the legal instruments of public participa-
5 The two terms are used interchangeably herein.
6 See principle no. 5 – “provide for an inclusive, participative and realistic debate on budgetary choices”.
7 See item no. 9 – the principle of complementarity which ensures mechanisms for public participation and 
to complement citizen engagement, as well as to “increase the effectiveness of existing governance and 
accountability systems”, which stems from item no. 10 of GIFT’s High-Level Principles on Fiscal Transpar-
ency, Participation and Accountability (GIFT, 2017b). The Principles of Public Participation in Fiscal Policy 
(GIFT, 2017a) have been translated into Croatian (IPF, 2017a), as have the GIFT’s (2017b) High-Level Prin-
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70 tion8 in the budgetary process in the Republic of Croatia. The primary goal of this 
interdisciplinary approach is to call attention to the significance and the economic 
effects of public participation in the budgetary process, identify the instruments of 
public participation in the budgetary process, as well as to explore their main 
elements and see if they can be instrumental to “participation in budget delibera-
tions” as per item 2.3.3. of the FT Code in Croatia. It is assumed that Croatian law 
provides various legal instruments for public participation in the budgetary 
process that enable the realization of participation principles as established in the 
FT Code, but also that they are not specific to the budgetary process itself; rather, 
they are so-called general legal instruments of public participation applicable in 
the law-making process and the process of adopting other regulations.
Following the introduction, the second section offers definitions and a brief over-
view of the forms and levels of participation. We also show how participation is 
connected with fiscal transparency, which is here seen in the context of the state 
budget, as well as its significance and effects on a country’s economy. The third 
section talks about the significance and practices of the budgetary process as pro-
vided by the FT Code and briefly discusses the open budget index as an interna-
tional comparative indicator of budget transparency, participation and oversight. 
Section four identifies the instruments of public participation in the budgetary 
process in Croatia and analyses what constitutes them. Finally, our conclusions 
are set out in section five.
2 aboUt PUblIc PaRtIcIPatIon
Public participation in the budgetary process is a manifestation of political par-
ticipation, consisting of “taking part in the process of formulation, passage and 
implementation of public policies” concerned with “action by citizens which is 
aimed at influencing decisions which are, in most cases, taken by public repre-
sentatives and officials” (Axford et al., 2002:102).
In the pages that follow, we will briefly introduce the notion of public participation, 
its forms and its levels, as well as its role within the framework of fiscal transparency.
8 To use the definition contained in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention, the text of which is contained 
in the Act Ratifying the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters), the term “the public” means one or more natural or legal per-
sons, their associations, organizations or groups. To find out more about the etymological, historical and the-
oretical approach to the public and its role and regulation in Croatian parliamentary law, see Struić: 2017. The 
budget process is a “system of rules, both formal and informal, governing the decision-making process that 
leads to the formulation of a budget by the executive, its passage through the legislature, and its implemen-
tation” (von Hagen and Harden, 1996:1), while the term budget means the state budget, or a “document esti-
mating the state’s revenues and receipts and determining its expenditure and outlays for a given year, in com-

















































42 (1) 67-92 (2018)
712.1 DefInItIon, foRMs anD leVels of PUblIc PaRtIcIPatIonThe term public participation in the context of fiscal policy9 has not been unam-
biguously defined in professional literature and is still vague (de Renzio and Wehner, 
2015:4). The reasons for this could be the fact that the development of participation 
as a dimension of fiscal transparency is a relatively recent event and that there are 
numerous activities that fall under its scope (Petrie, 2011:26), but it could also be 
due to the fact that research dealing in this topic is scarce. For the purpose of this 
paper, we used the definition by de Renzio and Wehner (2015:9) who define public 
participation in the budgetary process as “a wide set of possible practices through 
which citizens, civil society organizations, and other non-state actors interact with 
public authorities to influence the design and execution of fiscal policies”.
Forms and levels of participation. According to Bräutigam (2004:654) public par-
ticipation in the budget can take many forms: it can be (a) direct (such as when 
citizens “meet, debate fiscal priorities, and forward their conclusions to decision-
makers”), and (b) indirect (electing members of parliament). Fölscher (2010:41), 
furthermore, specifies the difference between consultative participation and em-
powered participation. In the case of the former, the government provides citizens 
and their representatives with “the opportunity to be heard, but there is no guaran-
tee that participation will be heeded”, meaning that “decision-makers have the 
freedom to agree with citizens or not”. When it comes to the latter, the participants 
are “invested with decision-making power” (right) “and influence, such as having 
citizen representatives on boards that oversee local public services”. Generally 
speaking, literature does not offer a list of forms of public participation in the 
budgetary process. This is partially due to their (growing) number, insufficiently 
clear differences, and scarce research on the topic.
Since the subject matter of this paper are the legal instruments of public participa-
tion in the budgetary process, some forms of public participation are noted only as 
an example (such as round tables and working groups), while the noted public 
participation levels (degrees) are in accordance with the Code of Good Practice on 
Consultation with Interested Public in Procedures of Adopting Laws, Other Regu-
9 According to Jurković (1989:1-2) there is no unique definition of fiscal policy or a unique attitude regard-
ing its role. He offers a broad definition of fiscal policy as “premeditated use of fiscal system instruments, i.e. 
public revenue and expenditure instruments in order to achieve any economic policy goals”, noting that one 
must have in mind the various effects of taxation and public financing of final consumption on the “state and 
trends in the economy” when evaluating the role and efficiency of fiscal policies. According to Jurković, the 
easiest and “in fact the only way to comprehend fiscal policy is to observe it in the context of overall econom-
ic policy” (Jurković, 2002:184), noting the need to differentiate between its practical aspect which includes 
“actual economic policy measures undertaken in a specific moment” and its theoretical aspect which is con-
cerned with the scientific discipline “investigating the role, character and effects of those measures in order 
to establish the principles and criteria guiding policy decision-makers in practice” (Jurković, 1989:1). Babić 
(1995:232) defines fiscal policy as “changes in public revenue and expenditure with a view of accomplishing 
a satisfactory rate of growth and price stability”, while Blanchard (2011:48) concisely describes fiscal policy 
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72 lations and Acts (hereinafter: the Consultation Code) which specifies four levels 
(degrees)10 of participation – information, consultation, involvement and partnership.
Before we set out to examine the significance of public participation in the budg-
etary process, we will clarify the relationship between public participation and 
fiscal transparency.
2.2 PUblIc PaRtIcIPatIon In the conteXt of fIscal tRansPaRency
Justice and Dülger (2009:263) note that there can be no meaningful, i.e. “authen-
tic” public “participation in budgeting without effective transparency”. They go on 
to explain that participation is meaningless if participants are not well informed, 
“and participants can only be well informed if there is effective transparency”. 
Something similar is noted in Fölscher (2010:14), who observes that the “lack of 
transparency undermines accountability and prevents participation”, as well as in 
Ott et al. (2016:10), who point out that “the public can effectively participate only 
if they have access to complete and timely information on the budget and budget 
process, and if mechanisms are in place to enable such participation.” According to 
Petrie (2011:6), fiscal transparency is a category, an umbrella term that includes the 
public availability of information, the clarity of roles, accountability and participa-
tion as dimensions of transparency. It follows that fiscal transparency is a precondi-
tion for participation, its conditio sine qua non; however, public participation is, 
simultaneously, one dimension of fiscal transparency. All in all, without transpar-
ency there is neither inclusion nor participation, and also no accountability (Musa, 
Bebić and Đurman, 2015:420), meaning that a non-transparent government cannot 
be considered as legitimate, accountable or efficient (Musa, 2014:18).
The significance of public participation and its effects on the economy. Consider-
ing the close connection between public participation and fiscal transparency, 
Fornes (2014:16) points out that there is evidence that they improve a country’s 
economy, since transparency and public participation “can help control leaks and 
improve allocation of public spending” as well as to “promote equality between 
resources and national priorities”, where transparency can help the government 
“to obtain international credit at a lower cost”. According to Ott et al. (2016:1) 
citizens who have obtained “complete, accurate, timely and understandable budget 
information” can “contribute to the more efficient collection of public funds and 
supply of public goods and services, thus increasing accountability of the Govern-
ment and local government authorities and reducing opportunities for corruption”.
Reviewing evidence on the impact of fiscal openness, which they consider to be a 
set of principles and practices concerning both transparency and participation in 
fiscal matters, de Renzio and Wehner (2015:33-35) list and elaborate a number of 
10 The International Association for Public Participation identifies five levels of participation: three are the 
same as those in the Consultation Code (inform, consult, involve), the fourth level – collaborate – corresponds 
to the partnership level from the Consultation Code. Empowerment is the highest level, where final decision-
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73studies and findings regarding the macro-fiscal impacts of fiscal openness11 and 
research on how fiscal openness is associated with changes in resource allocation, 
delivery of public services, and governance and development outcomes12.
Moreover, Heimans (2002:9) points out that participation reduces corruption and 
clientelism, as well as that participation leads to citizens having more trust in 
institutions and to increased democratisation of the formulation of macroeconom-
ic policy which may, by way of public learning about the key “resource allocation 
decisions facing governments”, lead to “more realistic public expectations about 
what governments can deliver through budget policy”. However, Heimans also 
notes that public participation can slow down the budgetary process, especially 
when the government lacks (expert) personnel and/or funds, which leads to 
“delays in the passage of the budget” – what is more, if the government is unable 
to provide the public with “timely, useful and accessible budget information, par-
ticipation and external scrutiny of the budget will in fact be hindered” (Heimans, 
2002:18-19), making participation truly counterproductive.
In a word, public participation is of exceptional importance not only because it 
enables the public to have a say in the design and execution of fiscal policy, but 
also because participation, along with fiscal transparency, has a substantial impact 
on a country’s economy.
3  bUDGetaRy PRocess In the conteXt of fIscal tRansPaRency: 
the eXaMPle of the RePUblIc of cRoatIa
According to Rubin (2006:140), the budgetary process requires clearly defined 
but neutral rules (independent of political interests), providing a “forum for the 
articulation, discussion and resolution of necessary policy issues”. The signifi-
cance of the budgetary process for a country and a country’s economy is visible in 
at least three aspects: first, decisions on the collection and spending of public 
funds are made in the course of budget preparation and adoption; second, in the 
course of this process the government defines the overall budget plan and plans 
the allocation of funds; and third, the allocation of funds ensures efficient govern-
ance (The Treasury of the New Zealand, 1996:124). It is also important to con-
sider its constitutional significance since, according to Article 104, par. 1 of the 
Croatian Constitution (hereinafter: the Constitution), the President of the Repub-
lic has the power of dissolution of the Croatian Parliament (hereinafter: the Parlia-
11 For instance, they refer to the study by Alt and Lassen (2006:13) who “find large swings in the budget bal-
ance in low-transparency countries”: in those countries, “deficits are more than 1% of GDP lower in a post-
election year than in an election year”, while the “dampening effect of transparency on electoral cycles over 
time leads to lower levels of public debt”. According to Hameed (2005), who examines a sample of 32 coun-
tries, increasing transparency is associated with better credit rating and related variables such as external debt 
and deficit levels. Similar results were obtained by Arbatli and Escolano (2012:13-14) who confirmed, in a 
sample of 56 countries, the association between higher transparency and better ratings, and a correlation sug-
gesting that budget transparency works indirectly through its effect on fiscal outcomes for developed coun-
tries, whereas the effect on credit ratings is direct for developing countries.
12 They mention, for example, a study by Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) about the impact of fiscal openness 
on corruption reduction and a study by Gonçalves (2014), who posits that “citizen participation allows for 
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74 ment) if the Parliament fails to adopt a budget at the end of the budgetary process, 
within 120 days from proposing the budget13. According to Bratić (2010:136), 
since the budgetary process is carried out according to an “established pattern and 
strictly defined rules”, it is of utmost importance that all taxpayers “understand the 
budgetary procedure in its entirety, so that they could have a say in the allocation 
of budget funds”.
FT Code practices. Since “the fundamental precondition for citizen participation 
is the prompt accessibility of accurate and intelligible budgetary and fiscal infor-
mation”, in other words, the transparency or openness of the budget14, the fiscal 
system and the whole of the public sector (Ott and Bronić, 2015:2), we will brief-
ly explain the practices involved as described by the FT Code. Namely, in order to 
effectuate the principle of public participation – according to which “the govern-
ment provides citizens with an accessible summary of the implications of budget 
policies and an opportunity to participate in budget deliberations” – the FT Code 
contains guidelines in the form of a description of basic, good, and advanced prac-
tices. In order to act according to basic practices, the “Government publishes an 
accessible description of recent economic and fiscal performance and prospects, 
as well as a summary of the implications of the budget for a typical citizen”. To 
act according to good practices, the Government, in addition to the above, should 
publish an accessible and “detailed account of the implications of the budget for a 
typical citizen” and provide citizens with a “voice in budget deliberations”. The 
third and highest level is advanced practice, pursuant to which the Government 
should publish “an accessible description of recent economic and fiscal perfor-
mance and prospects and a detailed account of the implications of the budget for 
different demographic groups”, as well as provide citizens with a “voice in budget 
deliberations”.
The example of Croatia – open budget index. According to Ott and Bronić 
(2015a:95-96) “Croatia does not at present meet even the basic-practices criteri-
on” when it comes to public participation. Namely, as a part of Government’s 
commitments as per the Open Government Partnership (OGP)15, one of the funda-
mental principles of which is citizen participation, the Ministry of Finance has 
since 2012 been publishing budget guides for citizens, but without providing a 
13 The budgetary process in the Republic of Croatia is implemented in accordance with the Budget Act and 
the Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament (hereinafter: Parliament Standing Orders). All three stages of 
the process (preparation of the draft budget, adoption of the budget and budget execution) take approximate-
ly two and a half years. The steps involved in all three phases of the budgetary process are outlined in Arti-
cles 22-60 of the Budget Act.
14 According to Bađun (2009:495) budget transparency is the “complete, timely and systematic publication 
of all relevant fiscal information”. She notes that the IMF uses the notion of fiscal transparency and defines 
it as “being open to the public about the government’s past, present, and future fiscal activities, and about the 
structure and functions of government that determine fiscal policies and outcomes”.
15 Open Government Partnership is a multilateral initiative that aims to ensure specific improvement in trans-
parency and openness of public authorities, engage and empower citizens and civil society, fight against 
corruption, and use new technologies for the improvement of service quality provided to the citizens by the 
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75summary of the implications of the budget for the average citizen16. In that sense, 
Ott et al. (2016:9-10) note that, according to the Open Budget Index (OBI)17 for 
201518, calculated by the International Budget Partnership (IBP)19 for 102 coun-
tries, “Croatia’s central government budget transparency deteriorated”. Namely, 
the average OBI score in 2015 was 45, meaning that the citizens of 102 countries 
have access to an average of only 45% of information on government revenue and 
expenditure in key budget documents; the OBI score for Croatia in 2015 was 53, 
or 8 less than in 201220, ranking Croatia among countries providing “limited 
budget information”. This is mostly due to the fact that the 2014 budget proposal 
“failed to include information on revenue and expenditure outturns for the years 
preceding the budget year” under consideration, which seriously hampered the 
analysis of the budget proposal. This means that the Government has not made 
available sufficient information for the public to effectively monitor the state 
budget spending and can therefore be held accountable for the policies it imple-
ments (for more information, see: Bronić and Urban, 2015:2).
Aside from the OBI score, two more results of the 2015 Open Budget Survey 
(OBS) (IBP, 2015a) for Croatia stand out. The score for public participation is 38 
(out of 100)21, noting that the Government is weak in providing the public with 
opportunities to engage in the budget process22. In light of the above, Bronić and 
Urban (2015:4) note that the body that provides “the most opportunities for the 
public to participate” is the Parliament, through its committees (the score being 74 
of 100), while “considerably less opportunities are provided by the State Audit 
Office” (the score being 25 out of 100) and the Executive (19 out of 100), pointing 
out that the State Audit Office, among other things, “failed to establish formal 
mechanisms for the public to indicate programmes or institutions that should be 
audited”, and “the Executive has failed to put in place effective and credible” 
formal mechanisms (e.g. surveys, focus groups or public hearings) “to find out the 
public’s opinion” on a state budget proposal or budget outturns. Finally, regarding 
16 Citizens’ budget guides are available at: http://www.mfin.hr/hr/vodici-za-gradane.
17 OBI is the only independent and internationally comparable indicator used for the measurement of the trans-
parency of central government budget, participation and oversight; central government budget meaning “all 
government budgets except the budgets of local government units” and the budgets of local government budget 
users (Bronić and Urban, 2015:1). IMF’s fiscal transparency ratings before the 2014 review of the FT Code 
were based on Fiscal Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes – ROSC. Following the review, the 
Reports were replaced by the new Fiscal Transparency Evaluation – FTE system to analyse fiscal transpar-
ency practices according to the FT Code. For more information, see: IMF (2016).
18 For the 2015 open budget survey, see: IBP (2015a); for methodology, see: IBP (2015b). The results of the 
next such survey, to include 115 countries, are expected to be available by the end of 2017 (see: http://www.
internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/2017-news).
19 IBP is a Washington-based non-profit organization conducting research in budget transparency since 2006. 
It engages independent experts from a number of countries to complete OBI score surveys and calculates the 
countries’ OBI on the basis of such surveys.
20 Previous scores were: 42 (2006), 59 (2008), 57 (2010), and 61 (2012); for more details, see: http://www.
internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=hr.
21 The average public participation score for the 102 surveyed countries is only 25.
22 Certain weaknesses exist on the local level as well. Only several Croatian towns have some experience with 
engaging citizens in the preparation of the local budget (e.g. Pazin, Crikvenica, Rijeka and Pula), making it 
hard to speak about specific models of participatory budgeting in Croatian local units. In most of the cases it 
is just a consultation process “without real engagement of citizens in the decision-making process on concrete 
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76 budget oversight, OBS shows that budget oversight by the State Audit Office is 
adequate (the score being 92 out of 100), while budget oversight by the Parliament 
is weak (27 out of 100), judging it necessary to establish a specialized budget 
research office within the Parliament. 
According to IBP, the measures necessary to improve participation are: establish-
ing credible and effective mechanisms (i.e. public hearings, surveys, and focus 
groups), ensuring that the public is informed of the purpose of public budget 
engagements and provided with sufficient information to participate effectively, 
and establishing formal mechanisms for the public to assist the State Audit Office 
to formulate its programme and participate in audit.
With this in mind, and especially since FT Code’s principle of participation 
implies not only the requirement to provide an accessible summary of the implica-
tions of budget policies, but citizen participation in budget deliberations as well, 
we will examine the legal instruments of public participation in the budgetary 
process in the Republic of Croatia which allow the realisation of that principle.
4  leGal InstRUMents of PUblIc PaRtIcIPatIon In the bUDGetaRy 
PRocess In the RePUblIc of cRoatIa
Since Article 212 par. 1 of the Parliament Standing Orders stipulates that the pro-
visions of the Standing Orders “pertaining to the procedures to enact laws shall be 
applied accordingly” to the adoption of the central budget – for instance, the pro-
vision on the commencement of the enactment procedure (Article 171), receiving 
and forwarding bills (Article 178), consideration of a bill in working bodies 
(Article 179), debate on the final draft of a bill (Article 195) and amendments 
(Article 196-202) – it can be inferred that the legal instruments of public participa-
tion in the legislative procedure apply to the budgetary process as well23. It should 
be noted that Struić and Bratić (2017), when studying the normative solutions of 
public participation in the legislative process through the role of parliamentary 
working bodies, using the example of the Finance and Central Budget Committee 
of the Croatian Parliament from the fifth to the eighth parliamentary term, identi-
fied the existence of several public participation mechanisms in the legislative 
process, specifically: the right of initiative to propose laws, i.e. amendments, the 
right to be informed, the right to advise, and the right to be involved in working 
groups and bodies.
We will start from these legal mechanisms (instruments) – which can be generally 
designated as general legal instruments for the purpose of this paper, considering 
their applicability in both the legislative process and the budget passing process 
23 It is worth noting that the Rules of Procedure of the Government of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: 
Government Rules of Procedure) contain no special provisions regarding the budget; rather, Article 30 par. 4 
stipulates in a general manner that the central state administration bodies shall, when forwarding draft bills, 
other regulations and acts to the Government, enclose the relevant reports on consultation with the interest-
ed public (only if carried out), while Article 174 par. 4 of the Parliament Standing Orders stipulates that the 
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77– and analyse in more detail what are their components and if they can be used to 
accomplish the objective to “participate in budget deliberations” as per item 2.3.3. 
of the FT Code. Moreover, we will examine if there are, apart from these instru-
ments, any other, special participation instruments, specific to the budgetary pro-
cess itself.
4.1 GeneRal leGal InstRUMents of PaRtIcIPatIon
Implementing the mechanisms of public participation in the legislative process as 
defined in the aforementioned paper by Struić and Bratić (2017) to the budgetary 
process, the first mechanism of public participation in the budgetary process that 
should be mentioned is the right to be informed.
The right to be informed. According to the Consultation Code, informing is the 
first level of participation, which “assumes a one-way process whereby state 
authorities” either inform citizens at their own discretion “or citizens obtain infor-
mation on their own initiative” (e.g. by way of official gazettes, the websites of 
state bodies, etc.). The right to access to information held by public authorities is 
guaranteed by Article 38 par. 4 of the Croatian Constitution and more closely 
defined in the Right of Access to Information Act. According to the Act, public 
authorities24 are obliged to publish many information25 “in an easily searchable 
and machine readable format” on their websites – for instance, documents rele-
vant to the public authority’s scope of activity, information on financing sources, 
the budget, financial plan or other appropriate documents that determine the rev-
enues and expenditures of public authorities, and data and reports on the execution 
of the budget, financial plans and other appropriate documents (Article 10 par. 1). 
Additionally, public authorities must inform the public of, among other things, 
agendas of meetings and sessions of official bodies and their scheduled times, 
manner of work and possibilities of direct insight into their work (Article 12 par. 1 
item 1).
In the context of the right to be informed, we should mention the provisions that 
enable public representatives to follow public authorities’ work and take part in 
sessions. For example, the Parliament Standing Orders contain several provisions 
on transparency of work (Articles 279-288), notably provisions on the obligation 
to inform the public of its work, its decisions and matters debated, and on the pos-
sibility for draft acts of Parliament or acts of Parliament to be “published in full in 
the public media or as separate publications” (Article 279), publishing its bulletin 
(“Parliament’s website shall be considered the official bulletin of Parliament”) 
and other publications (Article 280 par. 1), exempting from publication Parlia-
24 These are, inter alia, state administration bodies, other state authorities, bodies of local and regional self-
government units, legal entities and other persons vested with public authority, as well as other bodies as per 
Article 5 par. 1 item 2 of the Right of Access to Information Act.
25 According to Article 5 item 5 of the Right of Access to Information Act, the right of access to informa-
tion encompasses the right of the beneficiary “to seek and acquire information,” as well as “the obligation of 
the public authorities to ensure access to requested information, i.e. to disclose information regardless of the 
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78 ment documents and materials classified as confidential (Article 281 par. 1) and 
the possibility to close Parliament working bodies’ sessions (or individual parts 
thereof) to the public (Article 284). The public character of Parliament sessions is 
noted in Article 84 of the Constitution, as well as in the Rules on the Public Trans-
parency of the Work of Parliament and its working bodies regarding the “presence 
of representatives of citizens’ associations, non-governmental organisations and 
citizens” as observers at sessions, visits of organised groups of citizens to Parlia-
ment, methods of recording and broadcasting Parliament sessions, registering 
media representatives, and Parliament website content (Article 1).
Moreover, according to Article 9 of the Act on the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia (hereinafter: Act on the Government), Government sessions are public, 
but the Government can decide that the public would not be present at the session, 
i.e. debate on certain items on the agenda; moreover, pursuant to Article 32 item 
2, decisions, resolutions and conclusions can be published in the official gazette if 
the Government decides so when adopting such acts. Furthermore, the transpar-
ency of the Government’s work is determined in Articles 52-54 of the Govern-
ment Rules of Procedure, specifically Article 52 item 3 according to which the 
Prime Minister’s Office’s Public Relations Service shall issue a statement to the 
media regarding closed sessions at the latest within an hour after the session is 
finished (unless the Government decides that the public would not be informed on 
a particular issue). Government coordination sessions (sessions of its permanent 
working bodies) are closed to the public (unless decided otherwise by the coordi-
nation body chairperson) and there are no audio recordings, while the sessions of 
Government expert working groups are closed to the public and there are no audio 
recordings, without exception.
It follows from the above that, in the course of the budgetary process, the public 
has the right to request (and obtain) one or more pieces of information and that the 
public authority must enable access to the requested information, i.e. to publish 
information whether they have been requested or not (if such publication is 
required pursuant to a law or regulation). Moreover, the public has the right to 
follow the work of the Parliament, the Government and parliamentary working 
bodies (such as round tables) and to be present at their sessions, with certain limi-
tations: the public does not have access to confidential documents and materials, 
and the Government and Parliament working bodies can decide that a session (of 
a part thereof) would be closed to the public. There are no provisions, however, 
regarding the criteria for the Government and Parliament working bodies to fol-
low. It should, moreover, be noted that, according to the Report on the Implemen-
tation of the Act on the Right of Access to Information for 2016 (Information 
Commissioner, 2017), there have been “irregularities in dealing with citizens’ 
requests”, at all levels and in all kinds of bodies, particularly “with respect to 
deadlines and the manner of decision-making”. Cases of citizens’ requests for 
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79The right to consultation. The public can participate in the budgetary process by 
exercising its right to being consulted. Within the meaning of the Consultation 
Code, this is the second level of participation involving “a two-way process” in 
the course of which state authorities solicit and receive feedback “from citizens 
and the interested public26 in the procedure” for the enactment of laws and the 
“adoption of other regulations and acts”. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Act on the 
Right of Access to Information, public authorities are obliged to conduct public 
consultations via their websites or via the central state website for public consulta-
tions when adopting regulations and general acts, or other strategic or planning 
documents where these affect the interests of citizens and legal entities. In other 
words, these bodies must consult the public by enabling interested individuals or 
legal entities to deliver their proposals and opinions and by answering them. The 
proactive approach to the publication of information allows the public to get 
acquainted with the decisions of public authorities, enabling more transparency 
and more openness27 as well as more efficiency when it comes to the activities of 
such bodies (for more information, see: Information Commissioner, 2016). For 
consultation purposes, state administration bodies have at their disposal the cen-
tral state website for public consultations (e­Savjetovanja), while other public 
bodies (including local and regional self-government units and legal persons with 
public authority) can use their websites or the central state website for public con-
sultation, specifically by releasing “the draft of the regulation, general act or other 
document”, along with a “substantiation of the reasons and objectives to be 
achieved through the adoption of the regulation, act or other document, and invit-
ing the public to submit their proposals and opinions” (Article 11 par. 2). Public 
authorities “are obliged to conduct public consultations as a rule, for a duration of 
30 days”; upon the expiry of the deadline, the public authority is obliged to draft 
and publish a report on the public consultation, which contains the received pro-
posals and comments, as well as the reasons for their rejection (Article 11 par. 3 
and 4). The implementation of these provisions shall be monitored by the Informa-
tion Commissioner by reviewing citizens’ petitions, public authorities’ reports, etc.
The report on public consultations plays a significant role according to the Gov-
ernment Rules of Procedure, Article 30 par. 4 of which stipulates that central state 
administration bodies shall enclose reports on public consultations with the inter-
ested public when draft bills, other regulations and acts are submitted to the Gov-
ernment. This provision is applied when public consultations are conducted in 
accordance with special regulations, i.e. the Consultation Code, but not when they 
are conducted in accordance with regulations pertaining to regulatory impact 
26 According to the Consultation Code, these are “citizens, civil society organizations (informal civic groups 
or initiatives, associations, foundations, funds, private institutions, trade unions, associations of employers), 
representatives of the academic community, chambers, public institutions and other legal entities performing 
a public service or who might be affected by the law, other regulation or act which is being adopted, or who 
are to be included in its implementation”.
27 Unlike transparency, which is a one-way process enabling citizens to obtain information from public author-
ities at own request or on the basis of that public authority’s initiative, openness is a two-way process where 
information is offered to citizen, eliciting a feedback in the form of opinions and attitudes of citizens (for more 
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80 assessment.28 Moreover, reporting on conducted consultations with the interested 
public is mentioned in the Parliament Standing Orders, stipulating in its Article 
174 par. 4 that the sponsor shall enclose with the submitted bill a report on consul-
tations with the interested public.
However, according to the Report on the Implementation of the Act on the Right 
of Access to Information for 2016 (Information Commissioner, 2017) public 
authorities have not reached a satisfactory level of proactivity in the publication of 
information which would point to the adoption of transparency as a premise to 
guide their day-to-day activities. For instance, some public authorities do not 
update the information on their websites, there have been problems with the for-
mat of the documents, website availability and user-friendliness, clarity of pub-
lished information, etc. Even though the number of conducted consultations has 
been on the rise, especially on the central level, there is much room for improve-
ment regarding the quality of implementation29, particularly regarding the adop-
tion and publication of necessary documents (plans and reports).
Right of initiative. Furthermore, in order to potentially have an impact on the 
adoption of, or an amendment and/or addition to a regulation, act or document, 
citizens and other representatives of the public may use the right of initiative pur-
suant to Article 46 of the Constitution, by virtue of which everyone is “entitled to 
file petitions and complaints and to submit proposals to governmental and other 
public bodies, as well as to receive responses thereto”. This provision is refer-
enced in Article 44 par. 6 of the Parliament Standing Orders, according to which, 
“if a petition or proposal for the enactment of legislation or other acts is submitted 
by citizens to Parliament, then the Speaker of Parliament shall refer it to the chair-
person of the relevant working body which shall be obliged to notify the sponsor 
of the petition or proposal on the outcome of such a petition or proposal within a 
period not exceeding three months”. Apart from this right to legislative initiative, 
the same instrument allows the public to petition any representative, political 
group, Parliament working body or the Government (who are authorised to spon-
28 The process of regulatory impact assessment is governed by the Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment. Reg-
ulatory impact assessment is a procedure for the “preparation and drafting of draft bills through the analysis 
of direct impacts, aimed at choosing the optimum legal solution or undertaking other activities and measures” 
(Article 2 par. 1). Since the Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment applies to the drafting of draft bills (Arti-
cle 5 par. 1) and since only one specific act is passed under the budgetary process – the Act on the Execution 
of the State Budget of the Republic of Croatia for the current year – which having in mind the topics it regu-
lates does not fall under the scope of the Act on Regulatory Impact Assessment (Article 15 par. 1 item 3) or 
has it been included in the Annual Plan of Normative Activities (planning document on draft bills to be sub-
mitted to the Government in the course of the budget year (for a list of plans, see: https://zakonodavstvo.gov.
hr/godisnji-plan-normativnih-aktivnosti/229), it will not be referred to in this paper.
29 Witness to this are, for instance, the results of the Index of Good Governance in Croatia 2012 research, 
according to which only 14% of institutions (4 ministries) made an attempt at finding out the opinion of the 
public on what budgetary priorities should be in 2013, while only two of the 29 analysed institutions (the Gov-
ernment and the Ministry of Finance) made an attempt at finding out the public opinion on their budgets and 
spending in 2012 or 2013. It has also been noted that the majority of documents for the 29 institutions (budg-
et proposals, enacted budgets, semi-annual financial reports and annual financial reports) can indeed be found 
on the websites of the Ministry of Finance, Government, Parliament or the Official Gazette, but only as part 
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81sor amendments) to table amendments. However, it is usually unclear from the 
proposal of the act or the amendment if representatives of the public participated 
in their formulation (or, if yes, in which way and to what extent)30, making it dif-
ficult to determine the frequency (and efficiency) of the use of this public partici-
pation instrument in the budgetary process.
It is also important to note that the Consultation Code – a document that has been 
harmonized with a number of international documents, such as the Code of Good 
Practice for Civil Participation in the Decision-Making Process (Council of Eu-
rope, 2009) – stipulates the minimum standards and measures31 for conducting 
consultations with the interested public when drafting a regulation or act (resolu-
tion, declaration, strategy, programme, etc.) through which the policy of the Croa-
tian Parliament or the Government is expressed, and for whose drafting the central 
state administration bodies and offices of the Government are competent. How-
ever, as Ott and Bronić (2015a:36) point out, the scope of the Consultation Code 
has not been “extended to the budgetary process and the budget is formulated and 
presented in a relatively closed procedure”, while key budgetary documents such 
as budget proposals and semi-annual and annual reports on state budget have not 
been discussed. Yet, since the instruments of public participation in the course of 
the enactment of laws apply to the budgetary process and since the Consultation 
Code is to be applied in the procedure to enact laws, other regulations and acts – 
including the state budget – it follows that the general principles, standards and 
measures for consultations with the interested public stipulated in the Consulta-
tion Code should be applied to the budgetary process. On the other hand, it should 
be borne in mind that the Consultation Code is not legally binding, meaning that 
the failure to implement it does not result in sanctions, and that the deadline for 
consultations according to the Consultation Code is only 15 days, unlike the dead-
line for consultations set out in the Act on the Right of Access to Information.
The right to be involved. The third level of public participation, according to the 
Consultation Code, is involvement, which “assumes a higher level in the two-way 
process” through which citizens and other “representatives of the interested public 
are actively involved in the creation of public policies, for example through mem-
bership in working groups”. In this context, it is worth noting the provisions of the 
Government Rules of Procedure and the Parliament Standing Orders regarding 
the right to be involved, as the fourth key instrument of public participation in the 
budgetary process. According to the Parliament Standing Orders, the public can 
participate on the basis of the provisions on the establishment of special working 
groups by virtue of the decision of the chairperson of a working body (Article 53 
item 1), invitation of public officials, scholars and professionals and other persons 
30 Compare with Struić and Bratić, 2017:138.
31 Pursuant to Chapter V item 1 of the Consultation Code, this means timely information about the plan for the 
enactment of laws, access to and clarity of the content of the consultation process, the time limit for its imple-
mentation, feedback information about the effects of the consultations conducted and the harmonization of 
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82 to meetings of working bodies in order to obtain their opinions on matters being 
discussed (Article 57 par. 1), including scientific and other organisations and indi-
vidual experts in the preparation of acts or the consideration of certain matters 
within the competence of the working body if the relevant funds are secured 
(Article 52), and the appointment of public officials, scholars and professionals 
“to working bodies with all the rights pertaining to members of working bodies, 
with the exception of the right of decision-making” (Article 57 par. 3).32 Govern-
ment Rules of Procedure contain but one provision on public involvement, spe-
cifically the one regarding the possibility to invite established experts in certain 
areas to Committee sessions, i.e. Government coordination group in order to pro-
vide expert opinions (Article 21 item 6).
Moreover, the Decision on the Establishment of a Commission on Fiscal Policy33, 
consisting of six members (representatives of certain institutions34 appointed by 
the Parliament) and the president of the Parliament’s Finance and Central Budget 
Committee presiding over the Commission on Fiscal Policy, contains provisions 
on public involvement. Apart from the representatives of those institutions, other 
persons can participate in the activities of the Commission on Fiscal Policy (take 
part in the discussions, without having voting rights), and the Commission on Fis-
cal Policy can hire external experts for the drafting of the Fiscal Policy Assess-
ment Report (Article 25 item 1 and 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
on Fiscal Policy). Even though Commission sessions are, as a rule, closed to the 
public, it can adopt a special decision by virtue of which a session becomes open 
to the public (Article 20 item 1 and 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
on Fiscal Policy).
Partnership. Even though the Consultation Code provides a fourth level of public 
participation, partnership – as “the highest level of cooperation and mutual 
responsibility of the Government and representatives of the interested public in 
the process of adoption and implementation of programmes, laws, other regula-
tions and acts” (Chapter III par. 1 subpar. 4) – the research in the area of legal 
instruments of public participation in the legislative procedure has shown that this 
level has not yet been reached since there lacks the aspect of codecision as a pre-
condition for the implementation of that level of participation in the legislative 
procedure (Struić and Bratić, 2017:144). If we exempt the abovementioned exam-
ple of the Commission on Fiscal Policy, where decisions are made by a majority 
vote of all of its members (including the votes of the representatives of certain 
institutions appointed by the Parliament) – but not of other persons who might 
32 For more information, see: Struić and Bratić, 2017:142-144.
33 According to Chapter I of the Decision, the Commission on Fiscal Policy (hereinafter: Commission) is a 
professional and independent body the aim of which is to improve the public finance system and to monitor 
the application of fiscal rules as determined in the Fiscal Responsibility Act in order to contribute to “ensuring 
and maintaining fiscal discipline, transparency and mid-term and long-term sustainability of public finance”.
34 These are the representatives of the State Audit Office, the Zagreb Institute of Economics, the Institute of Pub-
lic Finance, Croatian National Bank, and business and law schools. These institutions choose their representa-
tives among established scientists and experts possessing a certain level of education, professional knowledge, 
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83participate in its activities – the lack of this precondition in the legislative proce-
dure should in principle be sought in the budgetary process as well, since the 
public officials, scholars and professionals appointed to Parliament working 
bodies have no decision-making rights, and neither do other persons who might be 
invited to participate in a session of a Parliament working body or a Committee 
session, i.e. Government coordination group to provide professional opinions.
4.2 sPecIal leGal InstRUMents of PUblIc PaRtIcIPatIon
Even though a number of regulations establishing various instruments of public 
participation in the legislative procedure and the budgetary process has been men-
tioned, these regulations make no mention of special participation instruments 
particular to the budgetary process.
Another important aspect of the legal framework governing this issue is the Agree-
ment on the Establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ESC)35. The 
Agreement stipulates, among other things, that the ESC, which represents the 
highest form of tripartite social dialogue in the Republic of Croatia, shall evaluate 
and offer its opinion on the measures aimed at macroeconomic stability, econom-
ic competitiveness, and a balanced economic and social development, and offer its 
opinion regarding the budget proposal and proposals for acts in the area of labour, 
economy, and social security. It also discusses and can offer its opinion on propos-
als for other acts and regulations of public interest (Article 10). Even though the 
Agreement may look like a special legal instrument of participation, since it 
expressly allows that the ESC offer an opinion on the budget proposal, we should 
note that it is in fact a general legal instrument since the ESC also offers opinions 
regarding proposals for acts, meaning that the Agreement is not, in its essence, a 
special instrument of participation particular to the budgetary process.
Even though consultation between Government representatives and social part-
ners under the ESC aimed at offering opinions on the budget proposal could be 
interpreted as consultation36, according to some authors, they do not represent 
public participation. Namely, according to Ott and Bronić (2015a:32), “citizens 
are not included in that stage, although the Government deems them to be in-
cluded”, as they can influence policies and consequently indirectly the budget 
through public consultations in line with the Consultation Code. They, however, 
point out that ESC opinions cannot be considered as participation in the formula-
tion of the budget and that this represents but a formal fulfilment of obligations set 
out in the Agreement because the discussion with social partners takes place only 
after the final state budget draft is adopted by the Government. According to the 
35 ESC is composed of Government representatives and social partners (higher-level employers’ associations 
and higher-level union associations). They may commence consultation before drafting specific documents.
36 Consultation in this context can include, e.g. the principle of offering comments as per Article 79 par. 2 of 
the Act on the State Administration System, according to which “ministers, secretaries of central offices, and 
directors of state administration organisations may decide that the drafts of those regulations in the prepara-
tion of which the public is particularly interested shall be published in mass media, and also invite all inter-
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84 Croatian Association of Counties, this is suggested by the fact that there are 2 to 3 
state budget amendments per year, “supported by all counties, but none has ever 
been adopted by the Parliament” (Ott and Bronić, 2015a:36).
In a word, the public has the right to informing, consultation, initiative, and 
involvement, while the right to partnership is limited to the possibility of partici-
pation through the Commission on Fiscal Policy, where decisions are adopted by 
a majority vote of all of its members (not including other persons who might 
participate in its activities). Apart from the latter example – the Commission on 
Fiscal Policy – the public does not have codecision powers in the budgetary pro-
cess, which is one of the preconditions for the implementation of this highest 
level of participation according to the Consultation Code. Finally, regulations pro-
viding the aforementioned general legal instruments do not contain special instru-
ments of participation specific for the budgetary process itself.
5 conclUsIon
The final review of the FT Code from 2014 introduces the principle of participa-
tion which is to be applied in the Republic of Croatia due to the fact that Croatia 
is an IMF member. With that in mind, as well has bearing in mind the fact that 
public participation, as one facet of fiscal transparency, is becoming part of an 
increasing number of international documents, this paper closely analyses the legal 
instruments of public participation in the budgetary process in Croatia. First, an 
interdisciplinary approach has demonstrated the significance and economic effects 
of public participation in the budgetary process, identified the instruments of pub-
lic participation in the process, and investigated their components and whether 
they can lead to “an opportunity to participate in budget deliberations” as per item 
2.3.3. of the FT Code in the Republic of Croatia. The assumption was made that 
there were various legal instruments of public participation in the budgetary pro-
cess in the Croatian law which would enable the implementation of the participa-
tion principle set out in the FT Code, as well as that they were not specific to the 
budgetary process itself but were rather general legal instruments of participation 
applied in the law-making process and the process of adopting other regulations.
Namely, it has been found that the provisions of the Parliament Standing Orders 
pertaining to the procedures to enact laws are applied to the passage of the central 
budget (Article 212 par. 1 of the Parliament Standing Orders), which has led to the 
conclusion that the legal instruments of participation in the law-making process 
are applicable in the budgetary process as well. With that in mind and based on 
earlier research into the normative solutions for public participation in the law-
making procedure through the role of parliamentary working bodies, finding that 
there were several instruments of public participation in place in the law-making 
procedure which can, in principle, be defined as general legal instruments, the 
authors analysed their nature in more detail and sought to find out whether they 
could correspond to instruments of “participation in budget deliberations” as per 
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85existence of other, special legal instruments of participation, specific to the budg-
etary process itself.
It has been found that the public has the right to be informed, to be consulted, the 
right of initiative, and the right to involvement, while the right to partnership was 
limited to the possibility of participation in decision-making in the Commission 
on Fiscal Policy. The right to be informed means not only the right to access infor-
mation, which can be requested at any stage of the budgetary process, but the 
proactive publication of information by public authorities throughout the budget-
ary process as well. The right to be consulted can be claimed only in the procedure 
of the adoption of regulations and acts or other strategic or planning documents 
that have an impact on the interests of citizens and legal entities, in accordance 
with the Act on the Right of Access to Information and the Consultation Code. The 
third instrument, the right of initiative, can be employed within the context of the 
Parliament, regarding the possibility granted by the Parliament Standing Orders 
for a parliamentary working body to discuss petitions and proposals, take them 
into account and, eventually, implement them in the regulation, act, or document 
in question. Within the context of the right to involvement, the public has the 
opportunity to participate by way of membership in special working groups (but 
only when this has been allowed by virtue of the decision on the establishment and 
appointing the members of a working group, made by the chairperson of the work-
ing body), as experts or representatives of scientific and other organizations (only 
under the condition that the relevant funds are secured) and as public officials, 
scholars and professionals (only when appointed by the Parliament), or Commis-
sion on Fiscal Policy members, i.e. representatives of particular institutions ap-
pointed by the Parliament (one member per institution). Since the aforementioned 
are general legal instruments of participation which are applicable in both the 
law-making procedure and in the budgetary process, and considering the fact that 
the instruments enabling an opportunity “to participate in budget deliberations” as 
per item 2.3.3. of the FT Code have not been precisely defined in the FT Code, it 
could be concluded that representatives of the public can use any of the aforemen-
tioned instruments in the course of the budgetary process in order to implement 
the principles of participation according to the FT Code, but only taking into 
account the constraints imposed by the regulations introducing those instruments.
There is a fourth level of public participation according to the Consultation Code, 
partnership, which implies the possibility of codecision within a Commission on 
Fiscal Policy, where decisions are made by a majority vote of all its members (in 
other words, including the representatives of certain institutions appointed by the 
Parliament, but excluding other persons that may participate in its activities). 
However, except in the latter case, the public has no codecision powers in the 
budgetary process, even though codecision is a precondition for the implementa-
tion of this highest level of participation. Namely, public officials, scholars and 
professionals appointed to parliamentary working bodies have no decision-mak-
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86 working body session or a Committee meeting, i.e. a Government coordination 
group session, to offer expert opinions. Finally, the regulations that provide the 
aforementioned general legal instruments do not offer special instruments of par-
ticipation particular to the budgetary process itself.
Having identified the available instruments and determined the possibilities to 
participate in the budgetary decision-making process in line with the FT Code, 
several potential problems have been identified regarding their efficient applica-
tion in practice, such as the fact that the Consultation Code is not legally binding 
and the failure to implement its provisions does not result in sanctions (it could 
only possibly raise the issue of political responsibility), or the inexistence of par-
ticular criteria when the Government and a parliamentary working body decide to 
close a (part of) a session to the public. Those and other potential issues – such as 
those mentioned when talking about the Report on the Implementation of the Act 
on the Right of Access to Information for 2016 – could lead to the assumption that 
there is some room to improve the current legal instruments of participation, but 
this issue should be analysed separately. Namely, if one bears in mind that the 
2015 OBI score for Croatia was 38 (out of 100) and that the Ministry of Finance 
has been publishing budget guides for citizens since 2012, which, however, do not 
contain a summary of the budget’s impact on the average citizen, it could be 
assumed that the true and full application of the public participation principle as 
defined in the FT Code by way of the legal instruments analysed in this paper is 
still some way away.
Finally, while taking into account the fact that further research is necessary to 
analyse the ways to improve the current legal instruments of participation, as 
noted above, it is worth mentioning some possible approaches to that end and 
formulate some general recommendations based on the research presented in this 
paper. The first option is to adopt a new Consultation Code that would explicitly 
include the budgetary process and be harmonized with the Act on the Right of 
Access to Information. However, one should keep in mind that the Consultation 
Code is applicable to the budgetary process without the need for this to be explic-
itly noted (since the Consultation Code is not only applied in the law-making 
process, but also in the process of making other regulations and acts, which 
includes the central budget). Moreover, the legal principle of lex superior derogat 
legi inferiori, according to which a higher-level regulation (Act on the Right of 
Access to Information) overrides a lower-level regulation (Consultation Code), 
could suffice when it comes to the contradictory provisions of the two. 
Moreover, a dedicated act – a code of fiscal transparency which would impose the 
obligation to strengthen fiscal transparency and participation in accordance with a 
number of international documents mentioned herein and particularly with the FT 
Code – should be drafted and adopted by the Government. Additionally, a set of 
guidelines for its implementation should be devised to guide not only the repre-
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87at large as well. Furthermore, the possibility to amend and/or make additions to 
the Government Rules of Procedure and the Parliament Standing Orders to deter-
mine the criteria under which the Government and Parliament working body can 
decide to close (a part of) a session to the public, among other things, should be 
considered, as should the option to strengthen partnership, the fourth level of 
public participation, by explicitly extending the codecision powers to (at least) 
working groups, for instance.
Apart from the above solutions which focus on the legal framework, the issue of 
its application in practice is significant, as well. Namely, as mentioned above, 
many problems are present in practice, particularly when it comes to the Report 
on the Implementation of the Act on the Right of Access to Information for 2016. 
These are, for instance, irregularities in dealing with citizen requests and ignoring 
their petitions, or the irregular updating of public authorities’ websites. The solu-
tions should be part of a comprehensive approach which would include not only 
the abovementioned options to intervene within the legal framework but to inter-
vene on the level of all government bodies involved in the budgetary process as 
well (e.g. training for staff, encouraging cooperation and coordination among and 
within government bodies, increasing their capacities). Moreover, this approach 
should include continuous activities aimed at strengthening citizens’ awareness of 
the importance of participation in the budgetary process, as well as the role of the 
legal instruments covered herein and how to use them. Without such a comprehen-
sive approach, the full implementation of the FT Code principles of participation 
will be impossible to achieve.
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